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Pragmatism and the Pragmatic 
Turn in Cognitive Science
Richard Menary
Abstract
This chapter examines the pragmatist approach to cognition and experience and pro-
vides some of the conceptual background to the “pragmatic turn” currently underway in 
cognitive science. Classical pragmatists wrote extensively on cognition from a natural-
istic perspective, and many of their views are compatible with contemporary pragmatist 
approaches such as enactivist, extended, and embodied-Bayesian approaches to cogni-
tion. Three principles of a pragmatic approach to cognition frame the discussion: First, 
thinking is structured by the interaction of an organism with its environment. Second, 
cognition develops via exploratory inference, which remains a core cognitive ability 
throughout the life cycle. Finally, inquiry/problem solving begins with genuinely irritat-
ing doubts that arise in a situation and is carried out by exploratory inference.
Introduction
This chapter examines the conceptual background to “the pragmatic turn,” 
particularly by articulating some of the central principles of a pragmatist ap-
proach to cognition and experience and showing how they are relevant to con-
temporary cognitive science (and its pragmatic turn). The main theme of a 
pragmatic cognitive science is that “cognition is for action.” The “pragmatic 
turn” provides a framework for understanding cognition that is distinctively 
different from a traditional framework that takes cognition to be structured by 
computations on rich representational contents (Engel et al. 2013). I propose 
that the new pragmatic turn in cognitive science is conceptually grounded in 
the work of the classical pragmatists, particularly Charles Sanders Peirce and 
John Dewey.
Engel et al. (2013:202) have formulated the pragmatic turn as follows:
In cognitive science, we are currently witnessing a “pragmatic turn,” away 
from the traditional representation-centered framework toward a paradigm that 
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focuses on understanding cognition as “enactive,” as skilful activity that involves 
ongoing interaction with the external world.
The pragmatic turn which they envisaged is largely a matter of sensorimotor 
interactions. While there is a good case for arguing that cognition is grounded 
in such interactions, it is not obvious that all of cognition can be exhaustively 
described in such terms. One of my aims in this chapter is to show that prag-
matists do not have to rely solely on a behavioral account of sensorimotor 
interactions with the environment. Peirce, for example, gave a detailed account 
of representation, or sign action as he preferred to call it, and did not think of 
these as exclusively action-oriented in Clark’s sense (Clark 1998).
To explain how we think by interacting with the environment, classical 
pragmatists develop this idea by framing the nature of the interactions in terms 
of exploratory inferences. The child develops cognitively by actively explor-
ing the local environment (usually under supervision), often learning about 
phenomena by physically manipulating them. Thus, the primary argument in 
this chapter is to re-focus the pragmatic turn into the kinds of exploratory and 
inferential actions that are core to the pragmatist project and to deny that this 
constitutes a slide into neobehaviorism.
I structure the discussion around three principles of a pragmatist approach 
to cognition, derived from the work of the classical pragmatists and contempo-
rary pragmatist approaches to cognition:
1. Thinking is structured by the interaction of an organism with its 
environment.
2. Cognition develops via exploratory inference, which remains a core 
cognitive ability throughout the life cycle.
3. Inquiry/problem solving begins with genuinely irritating doubts that 
arise in a situation and is carried out by exploratory inference.
I begin with a discussion of the difference between a pragmatist and internalist 
approach to cognition and include a discussion of a Peircean approach to sign 
action. Thereafter, I provide an account of the ﬁ rst principle in terms of senso-
rimotor contingencies and Dewey’s organism-environment relations. Finally, 
I introduce the second and third principles and show how they are related to 
contemporary work on active inference in the predictive coding framework, 
including a discussion of the relationship between Peirce’s conception of ab-
duction and Bayesian approaches to inference.
Pragmatism and Internalism
Thinking is an ongoing interactive process between the organism and the 
environment, where that interaction is at least partially constitutive of our 
thought processes. This is the key difference between pragmatists, who think 
that cognition is interactive and internalists, who think that internal systems 
 Pragmatism and the Pragmatic Turn in Cognitive Science 221
are sandwiched between environmental inputs and outputs. Internalists take 
thinking to be constituted only by processes which occur in an inner system 
with deﬁ ned boundaries, where interaction with the environment is deﬁ ned in 
terms of inputs to and outputs from the system. At least since Dewey (writing 
at the end of the nineteenth century), pragmatists have rejected an input-output 
picture of the mind.1 Consequently, a genuinely pragmatic turn in cognitive 
science would see an end to the model of the mind as a system bounded at the 
periphery by environmental inputs and outputs and see a turn toward empirical 
studies of how we think by interacting with the world.
It is of real importance that the pragmatic turn gives the right framework for 
understanding the interactive nature of thought. Pluralism about styles of inter-
action is very much in the spirit of the classical pragmatists. So we should be 
wary of moving from one dominant view of cognition as only being about in-
ternal computations on informational states, to another which treats cognition 
as only a matter of sensorimotor contingencies (enactivism), or that all cogni-
tion is aimed at predicting (inferring) sensory inputs from an environment that 
is external and never directly experienced (predictive coding). Sensorimotor 
contingencies and predictive inferences will no doubt be core methods for un-
derstanding cognition as interactive,2 but if there are differences in the interac-
tions (call these styles of interaction), then it is likely to follow that there will 
be differences in how we model or explain those different styles.
In addition, pragmatists and internalists differ on the role and importance of 
representations in cognition. Pragmatists are usually aligned with enactivism 
and embodied cognition in reducing the importance of representational expla-
nations of cognition, certainly in terms of internal representational states that 
cause behavior. This is often portrayed as a fundamental difference between 
whether cognition is primarily action oriented or concerns the acquisition of 
information and/or knowledge about the environment so as to be able to act 
upon it. Some pragmatists, however, deny that there has to be a complete break 
with the role of representation. For example, Clark (1998, 2008, 2013b) is 
a contemporary exponent of the pragmatic turn, who nevertheless embraces 
representation. In classical pragmatism, the great polymath and enfant terrible 
of classical pragmatism, Peirce, made the most signiﬁ cant strides toward a 
comprehensive theory of signs: from simple signaling systems in animals to 
complex linguistic interactions in humans. I brieﬂ y outline some of his central 
ideas here (with some modernization for a contemporary audience) to illustrate 
how pragmatists may maintain their pragmatic credentials while embracing the 
1 This is the sandwich model of the mind as described by Hurley (1998). I am referring to 
Dewey’s famous (and now neglected) paper “the intentional arc,” discussed further below
2 A residual problem exists concerning the relationship between an interactive model of cogni-
tion and a predictive processing one where external states of the environment are hidden from 
the internal states that make predictions on the basis of sensory inputs from the environment, 
especially if one of the leading ideas of the pragmatic turn is to reject the internalist input-
output model. This issue will be addressed later in the chapter.
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importance of signs in the mental lives of animals, even those strange primates 
Homo sapiens.
Peirce and Sign Action
Peirce is famous for his work on sign action and its relation to cognition. His 
work has been largely underexplored by contemporary cognitive science, with 
a few honorable exceptions (e.g., Barbara von Eckardt and Bill Ramsey). I 
have used a version of Peirce in several publications (Menary 2007, 2009, 
2013). The primary difference between Peirce and most of the theories of rep-
resentational content that have been formulated over the last forty years is 
that Peirce does not have a simple “vehicle as carrier of information” model 
of mental content, nor does he think that signs3 (or representations) stand in a 
simple dyadic relationship to an object. His mature view is that signs develop 
in a process of continuous dynamical interpretation.4
 What is essential to the sign relation? Gallie (1952:120) nicely illustrates 
the three essential features of sign action: “(i) A sign stands for (ii) an object 
by (iii) evoking some further sign of the original object.” This conception of 
sign action ﬁ ts with contemporary pragmatic cognition, precisely because it 
is a dynamical process: the evoked sign may determine a further sign and so 
on until some natural terminus is reached. A triadic relationship between sign, 
consumer, and object must be met for sign action to occur. 
Peirce’s system can be formulated in a modern context in terms of what 
I have elsewhere called the Peircean Principle (Menary 2007, 2009). The 
Peircean Principle maintains that any sign (including representations and in-
tentionally directed traits) must involve the following components:
• The sign-vehicle has certain intrinsic or relational properties that make 
it salient to a consumer. It might have iconic properties, it might be 
indexical (causally connected), or it might be symbolic and subject to 
public convention. In more complex cases the sign may have combina-
tions of these properties.
• The sign is exploited by a consumer in virtue of its salient properties, 
thereby establishing its function of signiﬁ cation (i.e., the function of 
signifying an object/environmental property, I thethe simplest case; 
3 I will stick with “signs” throughout the discussion, as “representations” imply determinate 
contents with truth or accuracy conditions. Signals and signs do not imply content and truth; 
they can be iconic in character, and thus quite indeterminate, and not imply any conditions for 
truth (since they make no determinate “statement” about the world). However, the conditions 
for when something can act as a sign are determinate and these are the conditions upon which 
I shall focus, leaving aside the vexed issue of content determination.
4 Interpretation does not have to be thought of as requiring a mind with the ability to interpret a 
sign conceptually. Peirce uses the neologism “interpretant” to distinguish between minds that in-
tentionally interpret signs and nonintentional consumers of signs (e.g., immediate behavioral re-
sponses or evolved producer-consumer systems of the kind familiar from Ruth Millikan’s work).
 Pragmatism and the Pragmatic Turn in Cognitive Science 223
however, an animal’s vivid coloring may be a sign of its dangerous 
properties and may evoke a behavioral response).
• The triad of sign, consumer, and object is established only when the 
function of signiﬁ cation is recruited for some further end (e.g., food 
detection).
The recruitment of the sign in virtue of its function is established as a repeat-
able pattern. Millikan (1984, 1993) shows how such repeatable signs are estab-
lished as proper biological functions, but the repeatability might very well be 
established by conventional means: as a social/public norm. Representations 
established biologically are teleonomic signs, and those established by con-
vention are teleological signs (Liszka 1996). The conditions can be unpacked 
in the following way:
1. A token vehicle Φ is a sign when it has properties that can potentially 
be exploited by a consumer. For example: Φ is salient because it is 
reliably correlated with an object or environmental property X, or with 
objects/environmental properties X, Y, Z....
2. Φ functions as a sign when its salient features are exploited by some 
consumer Ψ. For example: Φ has the function of signifying X for con-
sumer Ψ, because Φ is reliably correlated with an object/environmental 
property X.
3. Φ is a sign of X for consumer Ψ in the performance of some biological 
function (or for some conventional norm).
The conditions for sign action are simple: a vehicle has properties that are 
potentially exploitable by a consumer; these are its salient properties. It is con-
sumed in virtue of its salient properties. However, for the repeatability of this 
sign triad, we need the coordination of producer and consumer mechanisms: 
a sign is produced which is consumed for some further end. This process is 
established as a teleonomic sign if it is adaptively successful. Consider the 
following example:
During cricket phonotaxis, the female cricket can locate and move toward 
the location of male cricket songs (Webb 1994). She does so through the acti-
vation of two dedicated interneurons, each of which is connected to one of her 
ears. The strongest activation determines the direction in which she will ﬂ y. If 
the interneuron connected to her left ear is more strongly activated than that 
connected to her right ear, then she ﬂ ies to the left. There is an exquisite cou-
pling between the iterated song of the male cricket and the activation threshold 
and decay time of the female’s dedicated interneurons. Intuitively, we might 
think that the male’s song functions as a sign that the female cricket consumes. 
The triangulation is produced by the coordination of the male cricket song with 
the female cricket interneuron activation and decay patterns. The male cricket 
song is the vehicle with salient properties, and the interneuron is the consumer 
of those properties, establishing its sign function. The iterated song is exploited 
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by a consumer that recruits the sign to the production of some end, in this case 
directing the female toward the male to mate.
The very same conditions for sign action are the basis for teleological 
signs, and repeatability requires the coordination of producer and consumer. 
However, the process is established as a teleological norm by being part of a 
conventional system such as language or mathematics.
For our current purposes, the Peircean Principle demonstrates the complex-
ity involved in establishing a sign/intentional/representational relation. It re-
quires the coordination of producer and consumer mechanisms for some fur-
ther end; therefore it requires either the coordination of mechanisms within the 
organism or the coordination of a mechanism in the organism with a mecha-
nism in that organism’s environment.
The Peircean Principle is valuable because it allows us to explain how sign 
action works in both natural and social environments, by giving the same struc-
tural conditions for teleonomic and teleological signs. It makes no commit-
ment as to whether sign action must be internal, external, or distributed across 
brain, body, and world. It allows for all three possibilities.
Teleonomic signs and teleological signs should not be thought of as dis-
tinct categories. They are continuous with one another. There is a difference 
in that teleological signs will tend to be more ﬂ exible and open-ended in their 
range of interpretation. For example, teleological signs are subject to growth 
and development of meaning across populations of sign users and over time. 
However, their sign function is still established by the coordination of con-
sumer and producer: a sign is produced which is consumed for some further 
end. Consequently, the Peircean Principle is an account of sign action that is 
based in a principle of continuity not discontinuity.
Now think of teleological sign use in the context of an inquiry or a problem-
solving task, such as solving a mathematical problem using pen and paper. 
There are capacities for the creation and manipulation of external signs in the 
context of problem solving or inquiry. The act of problem solving takes on 
the sign action cycle. Teleonomic sign action and teleological sign action are 
located on a continuous line of evolution and appear in the developmental tra-
jectories of children. It is clear that pragmatic cognition will need to make use 
of both types of sign action.
Thinking is Structured by the Interaction of 
an Organism with its Environment
How should we understand the relation between an organism and its environ-
ment? In biological terms, following Godfrey-Smith, we can give a symmetric 
or asymmetric account. The asymmetric externalist explanation of the relation 
between the organism and its environment denies that there is any signiﬁ cant 
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level of feedback from the organic system onto its environment (Godfrey-
Smith 1996:327).
By contrast Dewey (1929/1958) provided a symmetric externalist expla-
nation which he called organism-environment transactions. In his epistemo-
logical work, Dewey denied the strict separation between mind and world, but 
this denial arose from his views on organism-environment transactions. These 
transactions allowed Dewey to bridge the gap between organism and environ-
ment because, although adaptations of organisms have evolved through the 
familiar process of natural selection, a strong distinction between the organism 
and its environment need not be made, as in the case of extended phenotypes 
(Dawkins 1982).
Godfrey-Smith identiﬁ ed a similarity between Dewey’s view (1929/1958) 
and Lewontin’s (1982, 1983): they both recognized a two-way interaction 
between organism and environment. Rather than the organism merely being 
the “passive” object of environmental selection pressures, the organism also 
reshapes its environment, thereby altering the“future course of the selection 
pressures to which they will have to respond” (Godfrey-Smith 1996:327). The 
organism and its environment are reciprocally coupled: the organism does not 
just passively reﬂ ect its environment; it affects that environment, through its 
responses and behaviors. Selective pressures upon the organism and environ-
mental niche are built up by their reciprocal coupling, such that they coevolve 
as a single system.
The organism-environment system is a biological basis for cognitive sci-
ence’s turn to interaction. What would the interactive approach look like in a 
cognitive context?
Dewey and Sensorimotor Theories
Dewey’s inﬂ uential paper, “The Reﬂ ex Arc Concept in Psychology,” was pub-
lished in 1896, but it heralds many of the arguments made by the contemporary 
4E movement (embedded, extended, embodied, enactive) in philosophy and 
cognitive science. Dewey begins by arguing that the existing model of the 
reﬂ ex arc, involving stimulus–nervous system–behavior, introduces a dualism 
between environmental input/output and central functions of the nervous sys-
tem; this replaces the Cartesian dualism between mind and body with one be-
tween environmental inputs and outputs and neural functions. The distinction 
between the environment and the central system reintroduces the problem of 
how to put mind, body, and world back together again. This model is anath-
ema to Dewey’s conception of organism-environment systems: “The idea of 
environment is a necessity to the idea of organisms, and with the conception of 
environment comes the impossibility of considering psychical life as an indi-
vidual, isolated thing developing in a vacuum” (Dewey 2008:56).
Dewey’s conception of, what we would call, the cognitive system is one 
that does not involve a self-contained inner system that processes inputs 
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and produces outputs. His conception of the reﬂ ex arc is one that involves 
an “organic unity” rather than “disjointed parts” (Dewey 1981:97): [S]ensory 
Stimulus, central connections and motor responses shall be viewed...as divi-
sions of labor, functioning factors, within the single concrete whole, now des-
ignated the reﬂ ex arc.” This “unity” of functions is best understood in terms of 
what Dewey terms “sensorimotor coordination” (Dewey 1981:97):
Upon analysis, we ﬁ nd that we begin not with a sensory stimulus, but with a 
sensorimotor coordination, the optical-ocular, and that in a certain sense it is 
the movement of body, head and eye muscles determining the quality of what 
is experienced. In other words, the real beginning is with the act of seeing; it is 
looking, and not a Sensation of light.
It is remarkable that Dewey wrote this in 1896, for it captures much of the 
spirit of the contemporary sensorimotor contingency approach to perception 
and conscious experience (O’Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2004; O’Regan 2011).
Conscious experience begins with a primary sense of embodied agency. The 
sensorimotor capacities of an infant are developing right from birth. Hence, 
it should come as no surprise that infants develop an exploratory and open-
ended method of interacting with their environment. The interactive nature of 
cognition grows directly out of these sensorimotor explorations of the local 
environment.
Experiences are these interactions of organism and environment. Dewey’s 
account of experience has strong afﬁ nities with recent developments in exter-
nalist accounts of cognition; particularly distributed and extended accounts of 
cognition (Hutchins 1995; Clark 2008) and enactive or sensorimotor accounts 
of perception (Noë 2004; O’Regan and Noë 2001). The importance of Dewey 
and Peirce’s work for embodied and extended approaches to cognition has re-
cently been made explicit by some of those working in the ﬁ eld. For example, 
Gallagher (2009, 2014b) and Menary (2007) both discuss the importance of 
Dewey’s conception of organism-environment relations as a grounding for 
contemporary discussions of embodied and extended mind. One important 
commonality between the pragmatic approach and the sensorimotor approach 
is that exploratory activity results in habits of action; or sensorimotor con-
tingency. Rather than encoding representations of the environment which are 
then processed computationally, the system is set up to explore and sample the 
environment in the service of action.
Cognition Develops through Exploratory Inference
In this section I explore some of the key concepts of classical pragmatism 
and their importance for the pragmatic turn. The ﬁ rst of these is the idea of 
fallible cognitive agents who actively explore their environments. Thereafter 
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I examine this form of exploratory inference in relation to Bayesian accounts 
of cognition.
An embodied form of active or exploratory inference is evident early on in 
ontogeny. Exploratory inference and Bayesian or predictive accounts of active 
inference (often described as exploratory) are quite complementary. Indeed, 
fallible exploratory inference can help us to conceptually frame the role of 
active inference in models of predictive processing. In particular, a Peircean 
account of abduction supplements active inference. Finally I argue for a more 
externalist interpretation of the role of active inference, using the pragmatist 
conception of active inference as a springboard and thereby avoiding an inter-
nalist view of the Bayesian brain.
Fallibilism and Exploratory Inference
As a pragmatist philosopher and scientist, Peirce proposed that thinking is a 
form of self-corrective practice, much like that used by the experimental sci-
ences. He provides an analysis of cognition that is thoroughly fallibilist (i.e., 
involving an epistemic agent who is capable of error and learning from er-
ror): humans begin our cognitive lives by fallibly exploring our environments. 
Through direct physical interactions with objects, we begin the process of 
gaining knowledge and an understanding of how to act effectively in our lo-
cal, developmental, environment5. Fallible cognitive agents learn from their 
mistakes. Our early and formative explorations are corrected and constantly 
updated in real-time and over developmental time.
A consequence of Peirce’s foundational work was to make fallible and ac-
tive (exploratory) inference the fundamental form of inference in cognitive 
systems. Exploratory inference is key to pragmatist approaches to the mind 
and cognition. In addition, pragmatists take the development of cognition seri-
ously. The pragmatist vision of the child is of a fallible agent who develops as 
a cognitive agent through exploratory interactions with the developmental en-
vironment. Consequently, the developing cognitive agent is open to the world 
through self-corrective actions (or practices). Cognition is thoroughly fallible, 
exploratory, open-ended, diachronic, and open to the local environment.
The Fallible Infant
As infants begin to explore their surroundings and interact with caregivers, 
their responses become more ﬂ exible and open-ended. A range of vocalizations, 
5 The classic articles where Peirce ﬁ rst begins to develop the fundamentals of pragmatism are: 
“Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man” (CP 5.213), “Some Consequences 
of Four Incapacities” (CP 5.264) and “The Fixation of Belief” (CP 5.358). All of his papers 
can be found in the Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce (1931), an eight volume compendium 
published by Belknap Press. In referring to his papers, I follow the convention of citing the 
paper by volume and paragraph numbers (e.g., CP 5.213).
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gestures, and actions become generalized and habitual. In line with contem-
porary developmental psychology, pragmatists think that the infant begins to 
develop “biases and preferences” as well as a basic capacity to “form and test 
hypotheses” (Stern 1985:41–42; Gopnik et al. 1999). Hypotheses do not need 
to be conceived as propositions that need to be interpreted and tested; they 
might be entirely spatial or action based, with the testing itself an action or 
exploration. We can be pluralists about the nature of exploratory inference and 
hypothesis testing. The pragmatic view of development is one in which learn-
ing occurs in a richly structured niche, which produces regularities in the sen-
sorimotor interactions of the neonate.
We might think about these early explorations as a way of adapting to the 
environment. Peirce, for example, held the view that the regularity of the in-
fant’s habitual activity parallels the regularity of the environment. This can be 
formulated in terms of a predictive coding account of perceptual learning: “Put 
simply, sustained exposure to environmental inputs causes the internal struc-
ture of the brain to recapitulate the causal structure of those inputs. In turn, this 
enables efﬁ cient perceptual inference” (Friston and Stephan 2007:433).
The learning environment should, therefore, be statistically regular with re-
peated gestures, sounds, facial expressions as well as stable objects, artifacts, 
and signs or representations. In Bayesian terms it facilitates the development 
of priors and stable predictions. “In summary, the free-energy principle can 
be motivated, quite simply, by noting that systems that minimize their free-
energy respond to environmental changes adaptively” (Friston and Stephan 
2007:428).
Even so, the environment is not wholly predictable and stable, exploratory 
behavior is still required. Consequently, pragmatism offers only a very mini-
mal nativism about cognitive systems with powerful learning mechanisms for 
interactively exploring the physical and social environment, rather than innate 
hierarchically organized modules with domain speciﬁ c knowledge. The cogni-
tive capacities of the fallible neonate include: associative inferences, imitation, 
and causal or Bayesian learning.
In evolutionary terms, Pragmatism does not align well with evolutionary 
psychology in its standard formulation (Barkow et al. 1992). It aligns much 
better with a niche construction account of developmental biases that are both 
endogenous and exogenous (Menary 2014; Odling-Smee et al. 2003). The 
Deweyean organism-environment system sits well in the niche constructionist 
account of development, since organisms reciprocally inﬂ uence their environ-
mental niches. “The evolutionary signiﬁ cance of niche construction hangs pri-
marily on the feedback it generates. Many organisms modify their own selec-
tion pressures, so that environment-altering traits coevolve with traits whose 
ﬁ tness depends on alterable sources of natural selection in environments” 
(Laland et al. 2000:134).
We are born with a high degree of developmental plasticity, and our brains 
exhibit high degrees of plasticity. It is evident that “development of neural 
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circuits in the visual system and acquisition of visuomotor skills critically de-
pend on sensorimotor interactions and active exploration of the environment 
(Held and Hein 1963). Even in the adult brain, there is considerable plasticity 
in cortical maps (e.g., in the somatosensory and motor system) that has been 
shown to depend on action context” (Blake et al. 2002)” (Maye and Engel, this 
volume).
Modern humans are born into a highly structured cognitive niche that con-
tains not only physical artifacts, but also representational systems that em-
body knowledge (writing systems, number systems, etc.) as well as skills and 
methods for training and teaching new skills (Menary and Kirchhoff 2014). 
Knowledge systems, skills, and practices are real and stable features of the 
sociocultural environment. Their early cognitive development is a process of 
exploring this environment. As their interactions become more stable and regu-
lar they begin to produce principled epistemic patterns of action, incorporating 
the skills, practices, and forms of knowledge that structure the niche in which 
they develop. Consequently, plastic brains that can learn in structured develop-
mental niches are prerequisites for fallible agents.
Exploratory Inference, Abduction, and 
Bayesian Approaches to Cognition
The pragmatist conception of cognition as an exploratory and interactive form 
of active inference requires some kind of account. Is it inductive or deductive? 
According to Peirce it is abductive: “[a]bduction is the process of forming 
explanatory hypotheses. It is the only logical operation which introduces any 
new idea” (CP 5.172). It is important to be clear that abduction, in this sense, 
is not exactly the same thing as inference to the best explanation (IBE). It is 
a form of creative abduction (Schurz 2008); it introduces new concepts, mod-
els, and hypotheses to test. This is because abduction is part of the process of 
discovery and not of justiﬁ cation alone: we abductively generate hypotheses 
to test. However IBE is important for determining which hypotheses are most 
likely to be true; this is a form of selective abduction (Schurz 2008). We can 
see how this might be the case in the following two schemas. Abduction as IBE 
follows the schema:
Given evidence E and hypothesis H1 and H2, infer the hypothesis which 
best explains E.
Criteria are then needed to decide what the “best” explanation is. Peirce’s ver-
sion of abduction provides a hint as to the nature of the criterion (CP 5.189):
Given the surprising evidence E,
If H1 were true then E would be a matter of course (explained by some 
systematic principle)
Therefore H1 is probably true.
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A probabilistic version of Peirce’s abductive schema can be given in the fol-
lowing way (Osei-Bryson and Ngwenyama 2011:412):
If hypothesis H explains the evidence E better that H1 and H2 combined, 
H is the more general hypothesis. We can now satisfy the requirements 
for assessing the posterior probability of our hypotheses by deﬁ ning the 
following constraint: IBE 1.2: Assuming that P(H) > 0 and P(E) < 1, if H 
entails E, then P(H/E) > P(H).
Peirce introduced abductive inference as the third type of inference (other than 
inductive and deductive). Clearly, abductive inference, as a species of amplia-
tive inference, is part of the logic of discovery in the philosophy of science. 
However, Peirce also thought of abductive inferences as part of everyday life 
and not solely at a personal level. So if we think of abduction as both creative 
and selective, then we can conclude that abductive inferences have a strate-
gic as well as a justiﬁ catory function (Schurz 2008). They produce “promis-
ing conjectures” (Schurz 2008:203) that call for testing by experience and, as 
Hintikka (1998) puts it: “stimulate new questions.” (Schurz 2008:205), use-
fully encapsulates the abductive pattern of inference as “the crucial function 
of a pattern of abduction…consists in its function as a search strategy which 
leads us, for a given kind of scenario, in a reasonable time to a most promising 
explanatory conjecture which is then subject to further test.”
Here I focus primarily on the selective role of abduction. Peirce hypoth-
esizes that these patterns of abduction are instinctual (CP 5.47, fn. 12; 5.172; 
5.212). I understand this claim as involving a minimal developmental bias 
for exploratory behavior, rather than as an innate module. Cognition is shot 
through with active exploratory inference that is abductive—a pattern of action 
that is a search strategy for a conjecture that can be further tested. As noted 
before, abductive inference can be an explicit hypothesis generation and test 
involving beliefs or theoretical posits; however, in early developmental, and at 
least some sensorimotor cases, the conjecture and test may be based on mo-
tor activity rather than on beliefs or representations. Therefore, it is possible 
to give a non-representational account of active inference, and this would be 
entirely consistent with the likely evolutionary origin of those inferences in 
sensorimotor interactions with the environment. This interpretation is consis-
tent with the reﬂ ex arc concept developed by Dewey (see previous section), as 
a matter of sensorimotor coordination.
The pragmatist abductive approach to cognition is complementary to the 
Bayesian approach to conﬁ rmation. Abduction is a process of selecting plau-
sible conjectures that require testing (Psillos 2000). The test, then, conforms 
to Bayesian processes, and may be neurally implemented along the lines sug-
gested by Friston and the predictive coding framework (Friston et al. 2013).
Many examples of perceptual inference conform to this combination of ab-
duction and probability. Take Schurz’s (2008:7) example of the explanation of 
sandal prints on a beach:
 Pragmatism and the Pragmatic Turn in Cognitive Science 231
If your evidence consists in the trace of the imprints of sandals on an elsewhere 
empty beach, then your immediate conjecture is that somebody was recently 
walking here. How did you arrive at this conjecture? Classical physics allows for 
myriads of ways of imprinting footprints into the sand of the beach, which reach 
from cows wearing sandals on their feet to foot-prints which are drawn into the 
sand, blown by the wind, or caused by radioactive decay of foot-shaped portions 
of the sand, etc. The majority of these physically possible abductive conjectures 
will never be considered by us because they are extremely improbable.
While there are many conjectures as to the causes of imprints in the sand, only 
some of them are probable and only probable against a set of prior expecta-
tions, assumptions, beliefs, or even physical laws. Consequently, we are un-
likely to entertain the implausible conjectures and eliminate them, leaving only 
those that are most plausible. Plausibility will be dependent upon our priors 
(in the Bayesian sense). Given a set of priors, some hypotheses will be more 
“plausible” than others, and it is from this subset of plausible hypotheses that 
we will select one to test.6
P ragmatic cognition is deﬁ ned by fallible and active explorations of the 
environment, which can generate hypotheses that can be tested by selective 
sampling of the environment. Hypothesis testing via active inference can be 
stimulated by an “irritating” experience and so has its origins in experience.
It looks plausible that active inference may play a role in abductive infer-
ence, in terms of reducing surprisal, but it also seems likely that certain prin-
ciples or rules of thumb will already do that job.
To return to exploratory inference, a child forming and testing hypotheses 
(with actions), reﬁ ning them and re-testing is a good example of everyday 
abductions (an example is given below in the section on The Manipulation 
Thesis). It is likely that her search space is not as restricted by priors as an 
adults, but this is a process of learning and experience generated by exploring 
and epistemically interacting with the niche.
An Externalist Account of Bayesian Exploratory Inference
One question remains to be answered at this juncture: Is predictive coding 
compatible with pragmatism since pragmatism requires continuous interaction 
with the environment? At least one prominent formulation of predictive coding 
starts from a position where internal mental states are screened off from the 
states of the external world.
The answer depends on the ﬂ exibility of the boundaries determined by 
Markov blankets between predictive processing in the brain and the body and 
environment. If we think of them as limiting determinate boundaries between 
6 Although we should note that “plausibility” should not constrain all conjectures given that 
some occasions require us to produce novel conjectures that might conﬂ ict with our existing 
background knowledge. Scientiﬁ c breakthroughs are often like this.
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mind and world, then this would contradict one of the leading principles of 
pragmatic cognitive science; namely, that cognition is to be studied in terms 
of organism-environment interactions. Following Hohwy (2013) I call the 
limiting role of Markov blankets the “isolationist” interpretation of predictive 
processing.
In the isolationist interpretation, there is a perceptual interface to an en-
vironment of hidden variables: the internal system creates internal models 
(representations) of those hidden environmental variables which then causally 
produce behavior. The internal states must predict the external variables via 
sensory input, but it has no direct access to the causal ancestry of the sensory 
input. This form of individualism is used as an explanation for why the models 
and predictions are required: “Because the brain is isolated behind the veil of 
sensory input, it is then advantageous for it to devise ways of optimizing the 
information channel from the world to the senses” (Hohwy 2013:238). Hohwy 
describes the mind-world relation as “fragile” because of the isolation of the 
brain, and this is why active inference is required.
For example, in Clark’s version of predictive processing, active inference 
and cultural props help to minimize prediction errors (Clark 2013b) and, as 
such, there is a deep continuity between mind and world mediated by active 
inference and the cultural scaffolding of our local niche. This interpretation 
of active inference appears to be more in line with the pragmatic approach. 
However, Hohwy thinks that Clark’s interpretation is consistent with his iso-
lated brain interpretation. Hohwy agrees that active inference and the cultural 
scaffolding of the environment help to change sensory input so as to minimize 
prediction error, but also “by increasing the precision of the sensory input” 
(Hohwy 2013:238). The primary role of predictive processing is perceptual 
inference; as a matter of “second-order statistics,” active inference helps to 
optimize sensory input so that perceptual inference is less error prone. “The 
key point…is that this is a picture that accentuates the indirect, skull-bound 
nature of the prediction error minimization mechanism” (Hohwy 2013:238).
Organizing and structuring our environments makes sense if the mind-
world relation is fragile in the way that Hohwy presents it, and also because 
this structuring makes perceptual inference more reliable. Hohwy’s position is 
radically at odds with the aim of the pragmatic turn. Remember that the prag-
matic turn consists of “a paradigm that focuses on understanding cognition as 
‘enactive,’ as skilful activity that involves ongoing interaction with the exter-
nal world” (Engel et al. 2013:202). This is clearly at odds with a new paradigm 
founded on the notion that cognition is based on a skull-bound prediction error 
mechanism that is only indirectly connected to its environment.
Active inference can be saved for the pragmatic framework if it is put into 
the broader context of the exploratory inferences of a fallible agent. As I argue 
elsewhere (Menary 2015), predictive processing is a subpersonal account of 
neural processes that ﬁ ts within a larger account of the brain-body-niche nexus. 
This is possible if we do not take the minimization of prediction error to be 
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the only kind of cognitive processing. Predictive processing might be support-
ive of interactive processing, but then it is just part of the processing routines 
available to an organism for completing cognitive tasks.
With this issue resolved, we now turn to exploratory inference and inquiry.
Exploratory Inference as the Foundation of Inquiry
The pragmatist account of inquiry, primarily developed by Peirce and Dewey, 
begins from the irritation produced by a situation in which further thought 
and action are blocked. Inquiry consists in the responses of an organism that 
succeeds in overcoming the problem situation. Over time patterns of response 
to a recurring problem situation can become habitual for the organism. The 
problem situation becomes more than simply physical stimuli; they take on a 
signiﬁ cant character in relation to the habituated organism. Consequently, the 
pragmatist account of cognition has an experiential origin in an “irritating” 
experience.
Take Schefﬂ er’s (1974) example of a cat placed for the ﬁ rst time in a box 
with a door and a latch on it, which, when struck, opens the door. With a 
saucer of cream placed beyond the door and in sight of the cat, it would not 
be surprising if the cat were to attempt to reach the cream. At ﬁ rst its actions 
might be random and spontaneous, being produced by the irritations presented 
by the circumstance (e.g., hunger, the inability to reach the cream, and so on). 
If the random movements of the cat were lucky enough to strike the latch and 
open the door, then the irritation would be appeased. Subsequent movements 
of the cat would become less random and more ordered, until they became 
directed at manipulating the latch and as such the cat would have acquired a 
habit with regards to the solution of the “puzzle box” situation. However, this 
is not a simple case of stimulus response correlation, the cat has developed 
a habit directed at appeasing the irritation which gave rise to its behavior in 
the ﬁ rst place. The cat’s movements are directed at manipulating the catch to 
reach a desired end. As summarized by Schefﬂ er (1974:43): “given this situa-
tion S, with perceptual and motivational features p and m, it responds appro-
priately with response R, to achieve the desired and perceptible consequence 
K.” Schefﬂ er stresses the importance of the meditational role of R; it mediates 
between the initial source of irritation and the state that the organism reaches 
in which the irritation is assuaged. This provides us with a model of belief and 
belief ﬁ xation, distinct from the traditional concept of belief as an intellectual 
state which is “removed” from the environment. Belief is tied to how we would 
intelligently act in a situation. (Although some beliefs may be far removed 
from possible actions, it is likely that beliefs evolved for action and that this 
remains their primary function.) The organism’s actions become self-directed 
and even self-controlled; this is different from classical behaviorism where the 
external stimuli control the behavior of the organism. The aim of inquiry is to 
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reach a settled state of belief, which is a settled habitual state that predisposes 
us to act intelligently.
The pragmatists were philosophical and psychological precursors to the 
current embodied and extended approaches to mind and cognition. Dewey and 
Peirce are explicit in their externalism about thinking. Thinking does not ex-
clusively take place in some inner mental substance or in some inner cognitive 
system. Thinking is an activity involving the interaction between an organism 
and its environment. The fallible method of thinking is the direction of activity 
to achieve some desired end. Like the cat in the puzzle box, we learn to ma-
nipulate the environment to achieve our goals. These manipulations become 
habitual and we do not even notice them in the background of our cognitive 
lives. This is the view that cognition is extended by our bodily manipulation 
of the environment (Menary 2007; Rowlands 1999), to which we next turn.
Principles at Work in a Contemporary Pragmatic Approach to Cognition
So far I have argued that predictive coding and sensorimotor contingency ap-
proaches to cognition are entirely compatible with the three principles. In this 
section I outline an approach that helps give further detail to the nature of 
interactive cognition and exploratory inference. This approach comes from the 
cognitive integration framework (Menary 2007), which taxonomizes different 
ways in which cognitive agents interact with, explore, and manipulate their 
environments by articulating the different ways that we manipulate the envi-
ronment to achieve cognitive goals. As such it is a contemporary pragmatist 
approach to cognition.
Cognitive integration is committed to the foundational pragmatist idea 
that cognition is fundamentally a matter of interaction with the environment 
(Menary 2007). This framework explains how we learn to be active cogni-
tive agents who think by manipulating their environments and interacting 
with one another in social groups. The integrationist framework also draws 
on cultural inheritance (Boyd and Richerson 1985) and niche construction 
models (Odling-Smee et al. 2003), which explain the evolutionary conditions 
under which richly structured cultural, and cognitive, niches are inherited. 
Ultimately, the integrationist framework explains how our minds are trans-
formed while learning the cognitive practices by which we carry out many of 
our routine cognitive and epistemic tasks. The core of the argument is that our 
cognitive capacities endowed by evolution are not sufﬁ cient, on their own, to 
explain how we develop higher-order cognitive capacities (e.g., those that re-
quire mastery over public representational systems). The capacities we acquire 
through our learning and training histories during the extended developmental 
period in human ontogeny are layered over, but continuous with, those basic 
evolutionary endowments.
The primary focus of cognitive integration is on how we create, main-
tain, and manipulate cognitive niches. We can give a causal or coordination 
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dynamics style explanation of these manipulations. A coordinated process al-
lows the organism to perform cognitive tasks which it otherwise would be 
unable to, or to perform tasks in a way that is distinctively different and an 
improvement over the way that the organism performs those tasks via neural 
processes alone. However, we can also think of these coordinated processes 
as normative patterned practices spread out over a population or group. Some 
of these practices will be cognitive in nature (Menary 2012, 2014, 2015); in 
cognitive integration they are referred to as cognitive practices.
Cognitive practices are enacted by creating and manipulating informational 
structures in public space, for example, by creating shared linguistic content 
and developing it through dialogue, inference and narrative or by bodily cre-
ating and manipulating environmental structures, which might be tools or 
public and shared representations (or a combination of both). Examples of 
linguistically mediated actions (or sign action in Peirce’s sense) include (a) 
self-correction by use of spoken (or written) instructions, or by coordinating 
actions among a group, and (b) solving a problem in a group by means of lin-
guistic interaction. Examples of creating and manipulating public and shared 
representations include using a graph to represent quantitative relationships; a 
diagram to represent the layout of a circuit or building; or a list to remember a 
sequence of actions, to solve an equation, to model a domain mathematically, 
to make logical or causal connections between ideas, and so on. Practices can 
be combined into complex sequences of actions where the physical manipula-
tion of tools is guided by spoken instructions, which are being updated across 
group members.
The Manipulation Thesis
Task-driven manipulation of the environment constitutes the contribution of 
bodily and environmental processes. Mark Rowlands (1999:23) describes the 
idea as:
[C]ognitive processes are not located exclusively in the skin of cognising organ-
isms because such processes are, in part, made up of physical or bodily manipu-
lation of structures in the environments of such organisms.
The manipulation thesis concerns our embodied engagements with the world, 
but it is not simply a causal relation. Bodily manipulations are also norma-
tive; they are embodied practices developed through learning and training (in 
ontogeny). Below I outline six different classes of bodily manipulation of the 
environment, with the general label of cognitive practices:
1. Biological interactions or direct sensorimotor interactions with the 
environment. An obvious example being sensorimotor contingencies 
(O’Regan and Noë 2001). A direct example of the ﬁ rst principle in ac-
tion and anticipated by Dewey (see above).
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2. Corrective practices are a form of exploratory inference and are clear-
ly present early in cognitive development. A classic example from 
Vygotsky helps to illustrate: A four-and-a-half-year-old girl was asked 
to get candy from a cupboard with a stool and a stick as tools. The 
experiment was described by Levina in the following way (his descrip-
tions are in parentheses, the girls speech is in quotation marks):
(Stands on a stool, quietly looking, feeling along a shelf with stick). “On 
the stool.” (Glances at experimenter. Puts stick in other hand) “Is that 
really the candy?” (Hesitates) “I can get it from that other stool, stand 
and get it.” (Gets second stool) “No that doesn’t get it. I could use the 
stick.” (Takes stick, knocks at the candy) “It will move now.” (knocks 
candy) “It moved, I couldn’t get it with the stool, but the, but the stick 
worked” (Vygotsky 1978:25).
The child uses speech as a corrective tool: “that didn’t work, so I’ll 
try this.” Speech as a corrective tool is normative, because it is a me-
dium through which the child can correct her activity in the process of 
achieving the desired result.
3. Epistemic practices: A classic example is Kirsch and Maglio’s example 
of epistemic action in expert Tetris players (Kirsh and Maglio 1994). 
Experts would often perform actions that did not directly result in a 
pragmatic goal. The actions were designed to simplify cognitive pro-
cessing. Other examples include, the epistemic probing of an environ-
ment and epistemic diligence, maintaining the quality of information 
stored in the environment (Menary 2012).
4. Epistemic tools: Many tools aid in the completion of cognitive tasks, 
from rulers to calculators, pen and paper to computers. Manipulating 
the tools as part of our completion of cognitive tasks is something that 
we learn, often as part of a problem-solving task.
5. Representational systems: Behaviorally modern humans display an 
incredible facility for innovating new forms of representational sys-
tems. (Remember that according to Peirce teleological sign systems 
are open-ended and ﬂ exible.) Humans also display a general capac-
ity for learning how to create, maintain, and deploy representations. 
Alphabets, numerals, diagrams, and many other forms of representa-
tion are often deployed as part of the processing cycle that leads di-
rectly to the completion of a cognitive task (Menary 2015).
6. Blended interactions are complex cognitive tasks that may involve 
combinations of practices in cycles of cognitive processing.
C onclusion
A pragmatist approach to cognition entails three core principles. First, thinking 
is structured by the interaction of an organism with its environment. Second, 
 Pragmatism and the Pragmatic Turn in Cognitive Science 237
cognition develops via exploratory inference, which remains a core cognitive 
ability throughout the life cycle. Cognitive agents are fallible: they start out by 
exploring their environments, develop inferential techniques for active explo-
ration, and maintain those techniques (scaffolded in development) throughout 
the life span. Exploratory inferences should be thought of as a combination of 
abductive search and Bayesian constraint. Third, genuinely irritating doubts 
arise out of a particular situation to initiate problem solving, thus prompting 
the organism to search actively for concrete solutions. Exploratory inference 
also serves to afﬁ x belief.
If the “pragmatic turn” in cognitive science is considered to be a matter of 
explaining all cognition by sensorimotor interactions, I argue that it will likely 
be found lacking. Although the pragmatists developed a view of cognitive in-
ference by actively exploring the environment, they did not think that all of 
cognition could be reduced to sensorimotor exploration, due to the role that 
representation, norms, and practices play in guiding exploration.
The pragmatic turn can make a real difference to the methodology and 
theory of cognitive science if it concentrates on the different styles of interac-
tion. The turn should be away from inner mechanisms crunching information 
toward engaged cognitive agents who explore and interact with their environ-
ments and who think in action.
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